The "Moscow signal" epidemiological study, 40 years on

2019 · Mixed · Very low evidence

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MixedVery low evidencePaper 1850

Study snapshot

Publicationmanual · 2019

Study typereview

Reported directionMixed

Evidence ratingVery low

Abstract

The "Moscow signal" epidemiological study, 40 years on Martinez JA. The "Moscow signal" epidemiological study, 40 years on. Reviews on Environmental Research. 34(1):13-24. Mar 2019. d oi: 10.1515/reveh-2018-0061. Abstract Between 1953 and 1979, the USSR irradiated the United States embassy in Moscow with microwaves. This episode, a classic Cold War affair, has acquired enormous importance in the discussions on the effect of non- ionizing radiation on people's health. In 2011, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified radiofrequency electromagnetic fields as being a possible human carcinogen (Group 2B), but the results of recent laboratory and epidemiological studies have led some researchers to conclude that radiofrequency electromagnetic fields should be reclassified as a human carcinogen instead of merely a possible human carcinogen. In 1978, the "Moscow signal" case was officially closed after the publication of the epidemiological study of (Lilienfeld AM, Tonascia J, Tonascia S, Libauer CA, Cauthen GM. Foreign Service health status study. Evaluation of health status of foreign service and other employees from selected Eastern European posts. Report on Foreign Service Health Status Study, U.S. Department of State 6025-619073, 1978), showing no apparent evidence of increased mortality rates and limited evidence regarding general health status. However, several loose ends still remain with respect to this epidemiological study, as well as the affair as a whole. In this paper, we summarize the available evidence concerning this case, paying special attention to the epidemiological study of Lilienfeld et al. After reviewing the available literature (including declassified documents), and after some additional statistical analyses, we provide new insights which do not complete the puzzle, but which may help to better understand it. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov Conclusions This event was just one of many that took place during the Cold War, and must therefore be assessed in the context of manipulation, political interests and classified information typical of the time. With the data in hand, with what we have been able to gather and what we have shown in this article, we can approach the truth, possibly even guess it, but not reveal it in its total dimension. And we will probably never be able to do so. Those who, in the published results we have mentioned, use this event to deny the harmful effects of microwave radiation do not have enough evidence to support their position. There are too many loose ends, unanalyzed information, methodological flaws, and debatable interpretations. However, on the opposite side of the debate, those who take this case as incontestable evidence of the harmful effects of microwaves on humans at low intensities, must also admit that there is a lack of statistical consistency in the results. There is still too much imprecision. A global vision of the whole event, including the nuances and details that we have explained in this article, show the latter to be closer to the truth than the former, even more so when we consider non-carcinogenic effects linked to what is now associated with electrohypersensitivity. However, it must be recognized that the methodology used by Lilienfeld et al. (1) also casts doubt on this claim, as the health status symptom questionnaires were filled in after the case was made public (nocebo effect). In addition, the results of our simulations are also partially dependent of the quality of data of Lilienfeld et al. (1), which were not complete, having a different degree of potential bias regarding mortality, cancer incidence and health status. Further research on the personnel of the Havana embassy who were recently subjected to a similar attack, could indirectly help to better understand what happened in Moscow more than 40 years ago. Power densities measured at the Moscow embassy were higher than the average levels typically found nowadays in homes, schools and urban areas, and were of the same order of magnitude as the more extreme case of living just a few meters from a base station (see (19)). This means that exposure at the embassy could have been high in terms of today's typical levels of exposure. Nevertheless, the exposure was several orders of magnitude lower than those suggested by the ICNRIP guidelines, adopted by many countries as legal limits. As Hardell et al. (19) indicated, the BioInitiative Report (49) with updated references defined the scientific benchmark for possible health risks as 0.000003-0.000006 mW/cm2. Consequently, the exposure at the Moscow embassy was from 3 to 4 orders of magnitude higher than this safety benchmark, but 3 orders of magnitude lower than the legal limits of many countries. In any case, and as Frentzle-Beyme (50) stated, "The level of proof required to justify action for health protection should be less than that required to constitute causality as a scientific principle". The "Moscow signal" remains a "signal"; let us not reject it, but listen to it instead.

Machine Enhanced Logic

AI evidence extraction

Structured fields below were generated from the paper’s abstract and metadata to make the evidence easier to inspect. Automated extraction may be incomplete or incorrect; verify important details against the original paper.

Study typereview

Effect directionmixed

PopulationUnited States embassy/Foreign Service and other employees at selected Eastern European posts (Lilienfeld et al. Foreign Service Health Status Study)

Sample sizeNot supplied

Exposuremicrowave · 1953–1979

Evidence strengthVery lowConfidence: 72% · Peer reviewed: unknown

Main findings

The 1978 Lilienfeld et al. epidemiological study is described as showing no apparent evidence of increased mortality and only limited evidence regarding general health status. The author reports reviewing available literature (including declassified documents) and conducting additional statistical analyses, concluding there are methodological flaws and loose ends, with a lack of statistical consistency, but suggesting the overall event may be more compatible with harm than with no harm, particularly for non-carcinogenic effects; the author also notes potential nocebo effects and incomplete data.

Outcomes measured

mortality rates
general health status/symptoms (questionnaires)
cancer incidence (mentioned as a potential bias domain)
non-carcinogenic effects linked to electrohypersensitivity (discussed)

Limitations

Methodological flaws and debatable interpretations in the Lilienfeld et al. study (as described)
Health status symptom questionnaires filled in after the case was made public (possible nocebo effect)
Incomplete data with differing potential bias for mortality, cancer incidence, and health status
Lack of statistical consistency/imprecision in results (as described)

View raw extracted JSON

{
  "study_type": "review",
  "exposure": {
    "band": "microwave",
    "source": "embassy irradiation (US embassy in Moscow)",
    "frequency_mhz": null,
    "sar_wkg": null,
    "duration": "1953–1979"
  },
  "population": "United States embassy/Foreign Service and other employees at selected Eastern European posts (Lilienfeld et al. Foreign Service Health Status Study)",
  "sample_size": null,
  "outcomes": [
    "mortality rates",
    "general health status/symptoms (questionnaires)",
    "cancer incidence (mentioned as a potential bias domain)",
    "non-carcinogenic effects linked to electrohypersensitivity (discussed)"
  ],
  "main_findings": "The 1978 Lilienfeld et al. epidemiological study is described as showing no apparent evidence of increased mortality and only limited evidence regarding general health status. The author reports reviewing available literature (including declassified documents) and conducting additional statistical analyses, concluding there are methodological flaws and loose ends, with a lack of statistical consistency, but suggesting the overall event may be more compatible with harm than with no harm, particularly for non-carcinogenic effects; the author also notes potential nocebo effects and incomplete data.",
  "effect_direction": "mixed",
  "limitations": [
    "Methodological flaws and debatable interpretations in the Lilienfeld et al. study (as described)",
    "Health status symptom questionnaires filled in after the case was made public (possible nocebo effect)",
    "Incomplete data with differing potential bias for mortality, cancer incidence, and health status",
    "Lack of statistical consistency/imprecision in results (as described)"
  ],
  "evidence_strength": "very_low",
  "confidence": 0.72,
  "peer_reviewed_likely": "unknown",
  "keywords": [
    "Moscow signal",
    "US embassy Moscow",
    "microwaves",
    "radiofrequency electromagnetic fields",
    "epidemiology",
    "Lilienfeld",
    "declassified documents",
    "mortality",
    "health status",
    "electrohypersensitivity",
    "ICNIRP guidelines",
    "BioInitiative"
  ],
  "suggested_hubs": [
    {
      "slug": "who-icnirp",
      "weight": 0.62,
      "reason": "Discusses IARC RF classification and compares exposures to ICNIRP guideline limits."
    },
    {
      "slug": "occupational-exposure",
      "weight": 0.46,
      "reason": "Concerns health outcomes among embassy/Foreign Service employees exposed at a workplace setting."
    }
  ]
}

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AI-extracted fields are generated from the abstract and metadata and may be incomplete or incorrect. This material is for informational purposes and is not medical advice.

Identifiers and source

DOI: 10.1515/reveh-2018-0061
PubMed: Not supplied

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